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INTRODUCTION
The decades-long civil war between the Sri Lankan government
armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (“LTTE”) came
to an end in 2009. 1 The conflict received much international attention
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1. Rupavahini, Live broadcast: Victorious Speech by President of Sri Lanka HE
Mahinda Rajapaksa at Parliament on 09-05-19 - Part 03, LANKAN TV (May 19,
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in 2009 due to allegations of international crimes perpetrated by both
parties during the final stages of the civil war. 2 United Nations (“UN”)
experts estimated 40,000 civilians were killed during the final offensive
that lasted from January to May 2009. 3 However, the Sri Lankan
government placed the death count at 9,000, with no civilian
casualties. 4 Several UN bodies have found credible allegations that both
parties committed international crimes, some of which amount to war
crimes and crimes against humanity. 5
Since the conclusion of the civil war, multiple national and
international actors have repeatedly called for impartial and transparent
investigations and prosecutions. 6 However, progress has been minimal.
Nearly twelve years after the end of the conflict, victims of the alleged
international crimes and their loved ones continue to await justice. Until
recently, international interest in the alleged crimes committed during
the civil war and calls for action seemed to have greatly diminished.
However, in January 2021, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, outlined “a number of options
[available to UN member states] to advance criminal accountability and
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sf-aSI4RB74; Deutsche Presse Agentur,
Sri Lankan President Formally Announces End of Civil War, RELIEFWEB (May 19,
2009), https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lankan-president-formally-announces
-end-civil-war.
2. Thamil Ananthavinayagan, Making Human Rights Violations Visible: The
UN Commission of Inquiry on Sri Lanka, JUST. IN CONFLICT (Jun. 21, 2015),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2015/06/21/making-human-rights-violations-visible-theun-commission-of-inquiry-on-sri-lanka/.
3. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts
on Accountability in Sri Lanka, ¶ 137 (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter UNSG Panel of
Experts Report].
4. Charles Haviland, Sri Lanka government publishes war death toll statistics,
BBC (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-17156686.
5. Violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, including
unlawful killings, torture, sexual and gender based violence, hostilities on civilians
and civilian objects, abductions, and forced recruitment, etc. Rep. of the OHCHR
Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL), Human Rights Council on Its Thirtieth Session, ¶
¶ 1113-1174, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/CRP.2 (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.refworld.
org/docid/55ffb1d04.html [hereinafter OISL Report]; UNSG Panel of Experts Report,
supra note 3, at ii-iv.
6. War Crimes in Sri Lanka, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (May 17, 2010), https://
www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/war-crimes-sri-lanka; Sri Lanka: UN
Members Should Back Hybrid Court, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 16, 2015), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/16/sri-lanka-un-members-should-back-hybrid-court.
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provide measures of redress for victims of the conflict.” 7 She
specifically mentioned submitting the situation of Sri Lanka to the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). 8 She then reiterated this in an
edited version of the report released in February 2021. 9
In response, the government of Sri Lanka rejected the proposal
from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights “to
advance accountability options at the international level,” including her
proposal to take steps towards referring Sri Lanka to the International
Criminal Court. 10 Subsequently, the United Nations Human Rights
Council (“UNHRC”) adopted a resolution that:
[D]ecid[ed] to strengthen … the capacity of the Office of the High
Commissioner to collect, consolidate, analyze and preserve
information and evidence and to develop possible strategies for
future accountability processes for gross violations of human rights
or serious violations of international humanitarian law in Sri Lanka,
to advocate for victims and survivors, and to support relevant judicial
and other proceedings. 11

These recent events have redirected attention back to the alleged
international crimes committed during the Sri Lankan civil war. 12
7. Rep. of the OHCHR on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and
Human Rights in Sri Lanka: Report of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (Advance Unedited Version), Human Rights Council on Its FortySixth Session, Feb. 22-Mar. 19, 27 January 2021, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/20 (Jan.
27. 2021).
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 59.
10. Comments received from the Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka on the report
of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on
promoting reconciliation and accountability in Sri Lanka (A/HRC/46/20), Human
Rights Council on Its Forty-Sixth Session, Feb. 22-Mar. 19, 2021, at 21, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/46/G/16 (Mar. 1, 2021).
11. Rep. of the OHCHR on Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and
Human Rights in Sri Lanka, Human Rights Council on Its Forty-Sixth Session, Feb.
22-Mar. 23, 2021, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/L.1/Rev.1 (Mar. 16, 2021).
12. Andreas Schüller, Universal Jurisdiction—The Most Difficult Path to
Achieve Justice for Sri Lanka, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/74941/universal-jurisdiction-the-most-difficult-path-toachieve-justice-for-sri-lanka/; Kate Cronin-Furman, UN Human Rights Council
Outlines Sri Lanka Abuses, But Demurs on Action, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 26, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/75510/un-human-rights-council-outlines-sri-lankaabuses-but-demurs-on-action; Press Release, Amnesty Int’l, Sri Lanka: Landmark UN
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While some victims’ rights groups 13 as well as the Tamil diaspora14
have welcomed calls for an ICC referral of the matter, it is important to
examine the realities and parameters within which such a process would
operate. It is equally important to examine Sri Lanka’s relationship with
the ICC and the possibility of the country willingly subjecting itself to
the Court’s jurisdiction.
Against this background, this article first attempts to set out the
ICC’s jurisdictional parameters with regard to the situation in Sri
Lanka. The purpose is to discuss the steps that need to be taken in order
for the ICC’s jurisdiction to apply to Sri Lanka and, more specifically,
to the situation in Sri Lanka with regard to the alleged international
crimes committed during the civil war. First, the article attempts to
address any obstacles that may arise when seeking to refer the situation
to the International Criminal Court. Second, the article seeks to explore
Sri Lanka’s relationship with the ICC from the Court’s formative years
to the present. This article specifically outlines the country’s
cooperation with, objections to, and attitudes towards the Court, with a
view towards ascertaining the reasons behind Sri Lanka’s decision not
to accede to the ICC’s constitutive instrument—the Rome Statute—or
accept the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to a declaration. Especially
given the recent renewed interest in the situation and calls to refer Sri
Lanka to the ICC, this article aims to set out some of the most relevant
issues and considerations surrounding Sri Lanka’s relationship with the
Court.
I. THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

resolution marks crucial turning point on justice and accountability (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/sri-lanka-landmark-un-resolutionmarks-crucial-turning-point-on-justice-and-accountability/; Julia Crawford, Bachelet
Denounces Continued Inaction on Sri Lanka War Crimes, JUSTICE INFO. (Mar. 26,
2021), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/75328-bachelet-denounces-continued-inaction
-on-sri-lanka-war-crimes.html [hereinafter Crawford]; Sri Lanka: Landmark UN
Resolution Promotes Justice, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.
hrw.org/news/2021/03/25/sri-lanka-landmark-un-resolution-promotes-justice.
13. Crawford, supra note 12.
14. Tamil Diaspora Calls on UNHRC Member States to Pass New Resolution
on Sri Lanka: Victim Community Endorses Strong Recommendations of High
Commissioner Bachelet, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.prnewswire
com/news-releases/tamil-diaspora-calls-on-unhrc-member-states-to-pass-newresolution-on-sri-lanka-301220293.html.
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COURT
The ICC only released a brief statement regarding the situation in
Sri Lanka in 2010, wherein the Court set out its jurisdictional
parameters with regard to the situation. 15 Sri Lanka is not a State Party
to the constitutive instrument of the ICC, the Rome Statute. 16 Therefore,
it is not currently subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. It is important to
note generally that should Sri Lanka become a State Party to the Rome
Statute, it would not be automatically bound by the provisions of the
international treaty that it accedes to because the country adopts a
dualist approach with respect to its obligations under international
law. 17 In particular, Sri Lanka would need to take an additional step to
enact national legislation in order for the international legal obligations
set out in the treaty to apply domestically. 18
Additionally, it is important to note that the Rome Statue entered
into force on July 1, 2002. 19 Therefore, the ICC only has jurisdiction
with regard to crimes that were committed on or after July 1, 2002.20
This means any alleged acts amounting to international crimes (i.e.
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) 21 committed prior
to this date, cannot be prosecuted by the International Criminal Court.22
If Sri Lanka were now to become a State Party to the Rome Statute
through accession, the ICC could only exercise its jurisdiction with
regard to crimes committed on or after the date of accession. 23
15. Clarification Regarding the Situation in Sri Lanka, INT’L CRIM. CT. (June 7,
2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=pr541.
16. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20ro
me%20statute.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2021) [hereinafter State Parties to the Rome
Statute].
17. Jeeva Niriella, An Appraisal on Some Aspects of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 21 SRI LANKA J. OF INT’L L. 193, 212 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
20. Id., art. 11(1).
21. Id., art. 5.
22. It is important to note, however, that additional jurisdictional exceptions
apply with regard to the crime of aggression. Id., arts. 8bis, 13, 15bis, and 15ter.
23. Id. art. 11(2).
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Therefore, any alleged international crimes committed during the
period from the date the Rome Statute came into force to the date the
Rome Statute would come into effect in Sri Lanka, would be precluded
from ICC scrutiny.
Given that the Sri Lankan civil war ended in 2009, unless the
alleged crimes were ongoing, this would mean the ICC would not be
able to exercise its jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any core
international crimes committed during the Sri Lankan civil war. An
exception would be if Sri Lanka accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC
through making an Article 12(3) declaration stating that it wishes to
subject itself and any alleged crimes previously committed by its
nationals or on its territory to the jurisdiction of the Court from an
earlier date (albeit, still, no earlier than July 1, 2002). 24 This option of
lodging an Article 12(3) declaration will be discussed further below.
Currently, two avenues exist through which any alleged
commission of core international crimes during the civil war in Sri
Lanka can be investigated and prosecuted by the International Criminal
Court. The first is through a self-referral of the situation to the ICC by
Sri Lanka, pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. This process
entails lodging a declaration with the ICC’s registrar accepting the
Court’s jurisdiction with regard to such crimes either conditionally (i.e.
for a particular set of crimes and/or for a particular period of time), or
unconditionally. 25 The second is through a United Nations Security
Council (“UNSC”) referral of the situation to the Court. 26 However, the
chances of either an Article 12(3) declaration being lodged with the ICC
or a UNSC referral of the situation to the ICC remains highly unlikely.
In May 2009, the UNSC expressed concern regarding the
humanitarian crisis unfolding in northeast Sri Lanka. 27 However, no
affirmative action was taken at that time. Moreover, despite the alleged
international crimes committed during the civil war in Sri Lanka,
predominantly during the final stages of the conflict, considered as
being on par with those crimes committed in Libya and Darfur
24. Id.
25. Aloka Wanigasuriya, Justice Delayed, Justice Denied? The Search for
Accountability for Alleged Wartime Atrocities Committed in Sri Lanka, 33 PACE INT’L
L. REV. 219, 245 (May 2021) [hereinafter Wanigasuriya].
26. Id.
27. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Sri
Lanka, U.N. Press Release SC/9659 (May 13, 2009).
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(Sudan), 28 the Sri Lankan situation failed to attract similar levels of
international attention. 29 Furthermore, despite the Court’s twenty-three
year existence (with its jurisdiction operational for nineteen years), the
UNSC has only referred two situations to the ICC from non-State
Parties to the Rome Statute (i.e. Libya and Darfur (Sudan)). 30 Twelve
years have elapsed since the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka. With
international pressure waning, at present it is doubtful whether there is
sufficient momentum that would push the UNSC to act in a similar
manner. Moreover, the prospects of a UNSC referral of the situation in
Sri Lanka to the ICC remains especially bleak due to Sri Lanka’s links
to countries such as Russia and China that have a powerful geopolitical
presence. Sri Lanka’s close ties to both Russia and China are
particularly noteworthy given that both countries are permanent UNSC
member states. Hence, there is a strong likelihood that any attempts to
refer the situation in Sri Lanka to the ICC would be met with opposition
and vetoed by both Russia and China.
Indeed, strong evidence exists of Sri Lanka’s close ties with China
and Russia. “During the previous Mahinda Rajapaksa government,
China was … one of Sri Lanka’s greatest allies at the UNHRC who
lobbied to defend Sri Lanka against war crimes allegations.” 31 During
a recent diplomatic visit to Sri Lanka in January 2020, the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, made assurances of China’s continued
friendship with Sri Lanka to Sri Lankan President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
stating that “China will not allow any outside influences to interfere
with matters that are essentially internal concerns of Sri
Lanka.” 32 China is also one of Sri Lanka’s largest infrastructure

28. Amanda Kramer & Rachel Killean, Security Council Referral to the ICC: A
Politicised System, 7 IRISH Y.B. INT’L L. 117, 142 (2012).
29. Wanigasuriya, supra note 25, at 246.
30. Libya: UNSC Resolution 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011); Darfur (Sudan): UNSC
Resolution 1593 (Mar. 31, 2005).
31. Russia and China Pledge to Protect Lanka’s Sovereignty Against Western
Meddling, SOUTH ASIAN MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2020), https://southasianmonitor
.net/public/en/srilanka/russia-and-china-pledge-to-protect-lankas-sovereigntyagainst-western-meddling; Wanigasuriya, supra note 25, at 246-47.
32. Three World Powers in Sri Lanka for Diplomatic Talks, NEWS FIRST (Jan.
14, 2020), https://www.newsfirst.lk/2020/01/14/three-world-powers-in-sri-lanka-fordiplomatic-talks/.
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investors. 33 More recently, Sri Lanka also became a beneficiary of
China’s vaccine diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving
600,000 doses of the Chinese-manufactured Sinopharm vaccine in
March 2021. 34 Russia has also issued lines of credit, military equipment
and aircraft during the civil war and afterwards, and continues to supply
such resources to Sri Lanka. 35 Russia has previously viewed any
international attempts at probing any alleged international crimes
committed during the civil war in Sri Lanka to be counterproductive.36
Such ties make a UNSC referral of the Sri Lankan situation to the ICC
highly unlikely.
II. SRI LANKA’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Following many years of discussion, 37 the United Nations General
Assembly (“UNGA”) convened the United Nations Diplomatic

33. Chinese infrastructure investment to Sri Lanka amounted to $12.1 billion
between 2006 and July 2019. See Ganeshan Wignaraja et al., Chinese Investment and
the BRI in Sri Lanka, CHATHAM HOUSE, at 2 (March 2020),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ8010-Sri-Lanka-RP-WEB200324.pdf; Contracts are said to have been awarded to a Chinese company to
build two upcoming irrigation tanks in Sri Lanka. Zulfik Farzan, (Video) Chinese
to build reservoirs inside UNESCO Heritage #Sinharaja as part of Water Project?,
NEWS FIRST (Mar. 21, 2021), https://www.newsfirst.lk/2021/03/21/video-chinese-tobuild-reservoirs-inside-unesco-heritage-sinharaja-as-part-of-water-project/.
34. Jointly Advance the China-Sri Lanka Friendship and Build the Great Wall
Against COVID-19—Remarks by Ambassador Qi Zhenhong at the Handover
Ceremony of the COVID-19 Vaccines Donation, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA (Apr.
1,
2021),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/
zwbd_665378/t1866141.shtml.
35. US sanctions on Russia firms hurting Sri Lanka, against SOFA for American
forces: President, ECONOMYNEXT (Jun. 26, 2019), https://economynext.com/ussanctions-on-russia-firms-hurting-sri-lanka-against-sofa-for-american-forcespresident-14556/.
36. Shihar Aneez, Russia rejects proposed war crimes probe for Sri Lanka,
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2014, 8:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-srilankarussia-rights-idUSBREA1D17520140214.
37. The idea for establishing a permanent international criminal court was
germinated through United Nations General Assembly Resolution 260 (Dec. 9, 1948).
U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
Overview, https://legal. un.org/icc/general/overview.htm (last visited Sep. 30, 2020);

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol52/iss1/4

8

Wanigasuriya: Sri Lanka and the International Criminal Court: An Uneasy Relatio

2021] SRI LANKA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

125

Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (“Rome Conference”). From June 15 to
July 7, 1998 the UNGA met in Rome, Italy to finalize and adopt a
convention establishing the International Criminal Court. 38 Earlier the
same year, the Preparatory Committee met from March 16 to April 3,
1998, during which it completed the preparation of the draft Statute of
an International Criminal Court. The Statute was subsequently
transmitted to the Rome Conference. 39
A. Sri Lankan Cooperation With the International
Criminal Court at the Court’s Inception
The Rome Conference was “attended by 160 States as well as by
the observers of the Palestine Liberation Organization, sixteen
intergovernmental organizations and other entities, five specialized
agencies and related organizations, and nine United Nations
programmes and bodies.” 40 In accordance with UNGA resolution
52/160 of December 15, 1997, “representatives of 135 nongovernmental organizations participated in the work of the
Conference.” 41 Sri Lanka was one of the states taking part in the Rome
Conference. 42 One of the Sri Lankan representatives at the Rome
Conference, John de Saram, also took part in the initial working groups
U.N.G.A.
Res.
260
III
A-C’
(Dec.
9,1948),
https://www.legaltools.org/doc/cee5ed/pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
38. U. N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Apr. 14, 1998),
A/CONF.183/2/Add.1, https://undocs.org/en/A/CONF.183/2/Add.1(last visited 31
March 2021) [hereinafter Report of Prep. Committee on Establishment of an ICC].
39. International Law Commission, Draft code of crimes against the peace and
security of mankind (Part II)—including the draft Statute for an international criminal
court (Dec. 4, 2017), https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.shtml#a46 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2021); Report of Prep. Committee on Establishment of an ICC, supra note
38.
40. U. N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998), https://legal.un.org
/diplomaticconferences/1998_icc/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2021).
41. Id.
42. U. N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, A/CONF.183/10, Annex II, pg. 11 (Jul. 17, 1998).
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that initiated the process of a draft statute for an international criminal
court. 43 At these early stages, he took part in the working groups in his
capacity as a member of the International Law Commission (“ILC”).
For instance, John de Saram was both a member of the “Working Group
on the question of an international criminal jurisdiction” 44 and later, the
“Working Group on a draft statute for an international criminal court,”45
which were both set up by the International Law Commission.
The Sri Lankan delegation at the Rome Conference consisted of:
Mr. John de Saram, Mr. H. M. G. S. Palihakkara, Dr. A. R. Perera, Mr.
H. L. de Silva, and Ms. S. N. Mayadunne. 46 As previously stated, the
Rome “Conference had before it the draft Statute which was assigned
to the Committee of the Whole for its consideration.” 47 Here, the Sri
Lankan delegation made several submissions regarding the ICC’s
parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction. For instance, Sri Lankan
representative, John de Saram, submitted “that, given the clarity of
general international treaty law and customary law with respect to the
crime of genocide, it was reasonable to expect that a State becoming a
party to the Statute should thereby accept the Court’s jurisdiction with
43. Id. at 34
44. E.g. John de Saram, was a member of the “Working Group on the question
of an international criminal jurisdiction,” which was re-established at the ILC’s 2298th
meeting on 17 May 1993 (on 25 May 1993, at its 2300th meeting, the ILC decided to
rename this working group the “Working Group on a draft statute for an international
criminal court”). See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work
of Its Forty-Fifth Session, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1993) Vol. II(2),
A/CN.4/SER.A/1993/Add.l (Part 2) & Doc. A/48/10, at 10.
45. E.g. John de Saram, was a member of the “Working Group on a draft statute
for an international criminal court” approved by the ILC at its 2332nd meeting on 5
May 1994. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FortySixth Session, 2 May—22 July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, FortyNinth Session, Supplement No. 10, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n Vol. II(2), Doc. A/49/10, at
15-16.
46. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Official Records, Volume II: Summary records of the
plenary meetings and of the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, (2002),
A/CONF.183/13 (Vol.II), (June 15—July 17, 1998), https://legal.un.org/icc/rome/
proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings_v2_e.pdf (last visited March 30, 2021), at 34
[hereinafter Rome Conference Official Records].
47. International Law Commission, Draft code of crimes against the peace and
security of mankind (Part II)including the draft Statute for an international criminal
court, (Dec, 4, 2017), https://legal.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.shtml (last visited Apr.
13, 2021).
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respect to that crime.” 48 However, he opined that “[t]he same clarity did
not obtain with respect to war crimes and crimes against humanity …
[and that] therefore … acceptance of jurisdiction over those crimes
should be in accordance with the so-called opt-in procedure.” 49
Moreover, in terms of the preconditions for accepting jurisdiction
(draft Article 7), with regard to non-State parties to the Statute, Sri
Lanka supported an approach where such a “State may, by an express
declaration deposited with the Registrar of the Court, agree that the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction in respect of the acts specified in the
declaration.” 50 Furthermore, Sri Lanka favored the inclusion of an
added requirement requiring “the consent of the State in which the
suspect was present.” 51
The Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers—and the complementarity
assessment that forms part of the Prosecutor’s considerations when
deciding whether to exercise such powers—is linked to the issue of the
exercise of jurisdiction. 52 During the Rome Conference, the Sri Lankan
delegation objected to the proprio motu powers entrusted to the Court’s
Prosecutor in draft Article 12. 53 Instead, the Sri Lankan delegation
viewed “the position of a prosecutor in international jurisdictions [as
being] differ[ent] from his or her position in national jurisdictions.”54
Sri Lanka lamented that no justification in international law existed for
the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers as envisaged under draft Article
12, which in its view “seriously threatened the principle of
complementarity.” 55 However, with regard to the issue of
complementarity (as encompassed in the admissibility assessment
outlined in draft Articles 15 and 16), the Sri Lankan delegation
submitted that: “Once the crimes to come before the Court had been
determined, the question of complementarity was a necessary but not
an essential component.” 56
48.
49.
50.
at 31.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 46, at 314.
Id.
Id.; Report of Prep. Committee on Establishment of an ICC, supra note 38,
Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 46, at 314.
Rome Statute, supra note 19, arts. 15 and 17.
Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 46, at 314.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 314.
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Another of Sri Lanka’s arguments against consenting to the ICC’s
jurisdiction related to the issue of war crimes. One of the Sri Lankan
representatives submitted “that there was a need for a high threshold
with respect to war crimes, as not all crimes committed in time of war
amounted to grave breaches of the rules of war.” 57 Furthermore, the Sri
Lankan delegation raised particular concerns regarding provisions
linked to war crimes committed during non-international armed
conflicts. 58 This was perhaps unsurprising given that the Sri Lankan
civil war, which was ongoing at the time, would have been classified as
a non-international armed conflict. 59
At the Rome Conference, Sri Lanka expressed concerns regarding
draft Article 5(D), which addressed war crimes committed during
armed conflicts not of an international character. 60 Sri Lanka viewed
this draft provision as problematic when applied in the context of
internal conflicts “in States with functioning legal systems and
institutions,” seeing it as conflicting with the principle of
complementarity. 61 However, “[i]n a spirit of compromise,” the Sri
Lankan “delegation was prepared to consider accepting the provision
contained in section D, subparagraph (f), on the clear understanding that
an opt-in regime would be adopted in respect of war crimes.” 62 Draft
Article 5(D)(f) addressed the issue of forcibly recruiting children to take
part in active hostilities. 63
This willingness to compromise on the inclusion of war crimes
provisions pertaining to the recruitment of child soldiers was perhaps
unsurprising given that, at the time, Sri Lanka was embroiled in an
internal armed conflict against the LTTE, a guerilla group, which were
allegedly recruiting child soldiers. 64 The LTTE’s recruitment and use
57. Id. at 339.
58. Id.
59. The Law of Armed Conflict: Non-International Armed Conflict, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS: UNIT FOR RELATIONS WITH ARMED AND SECURITY
FORCES 25 (Jun. 2002), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/law10_
final.pdf.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Report of Prep. Committee on Establishment of an ICC, supra note 38, at
23.
64. Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Nov. 11, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/11/10/living-fear/child-
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of child soldiers has been labeled “one of the worst aspects of the …
conflict” 65 and “a vital part of the LTTE strategy.” 66 Additionally,
during the Rome Conference, Sri Lanka “strongly advocated [for] the
inclusion of nuclear weapons in the list of prohibited weapons,” in
provisions relating to war crimes. 67
The Sri Lankan delegation also supported the inclusion of the crime
of terrorism and crimes related to illicit drug trafficking in the Statute. 68
One of the Sri Lankan representatives, H. M. G. S. Palihakkara,
submitted that “[h]is delegation believed that [such] an inclusive
approach would promote more broad-based support for the Statute and
the universality of its jurisdiction.” 69 In connection to this, Sri Lanka,
India, and Turkey proposed the inclusion of the act of terrorism in the
definition of crimes against humanity.70 The Sri Lankan delegation
argued that “[t]o exclude terrorism and drug trafficking from the scope
of the Statute would constitute a grave omission” as “[t]he distinction
between core crimes and treaty crimes was an artificial one: the
infliction of indiscriminate violence on innocent civilians was legally
unacceptable and morally reprehensible in times of war and peace
alike.” 71

soldiers-and-tamil-tigers-sri-lanka [hereinafter Living in Fear]; P. SINGER, CHILDREN
AT WAR 5 (U. of CA Press, Los Angeles ed. 2006); David H. Gray and Tom Owen
Matchin III, Children: The New Face of Terrorism, 6 INT’L NGO J. 108, 109 (2008).
65. Living in Fear, supra note 64.
66. The LTTE is said to have begun using children in the nine to twelve years
age range due to a shortage in manpower when fighting against Indian peacekeeping
forces present in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR 5 (2006);
Furthermore, of the LTTE combatants killed during the 1990s, forty to sixty percent
were children under the age of eighteen. Living in Fear, supra note 65; Gray, supra
note 64, at 108, 109..
67. Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 46, at 339.
68. Id. at 176.
69. Id.
70. U.N. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ROME, 15 June—17 July
1998, Official Records, Volume III: Reports and Documents, (2002),
A/CONF.183/C.1/L.27/REV.1 (2002);. U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, ‘Proposal
Submitted by India, Sri Lanka and Turkey. Article 5. Crimes within the jurisdiction
of the Court,’ A/CONF.183/C.1/L.27/Rev.1 (1998).
71. Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 46, at 339.
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Sri Lanka’s proposal to include the crime of terrorism and crimes
related to illicit drug trafficking in the Statute may have been inspired
by national conditions prevalent at the time. For instance, the LTTE had
been accused of possibly engaging in narcotics trafficking in order to
raise revenue for their activities. 72 The LTTE was also gaining a
reputation as a terrorist organization due to numerous incidents of
carrying out “suicide terrorism.” 73 It is claimed to have been “the only
group that has successfully assassinated two heads of state” (i.e. Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 74 and Sri Lankan President
Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1993) 75 as well as “several presidential
candidates … five cabinet ministers[, and] … numerous other political,
governmental, military, and security force personnel.” 76
In the years leading up to the Rome Conference, the LTTE had also
successfully conducted suicide-bombing attacks against some of Sri
Lanka’s major economic institutions (e.g. Central Bank bombing,
Colombo in 1996) and cultural institutions (e.g. the Temple of the
Tooth Relic bombing, Kandy in 1998). 77 The United States had already
designated the LTTE “a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) as
early as 1997.” 78 However, despite Sri Lanka’s efforts, the proposal did
not attract significant support and neither terrorism nor drug trafficking

72. C. Christine Fair, Urban Battle Fields of South Asia: Lessons Learned from
Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan, RAND CORPORATION (2004), at 31, 33; A Global
Overview of Narcotics Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups, THE LIBRARY
CONGRESS
7-8
(May
2002),
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdfOF
files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf. .
73. The LTTE is said to have carried out 168 of the 271 known suicide attacks
executed by all groups throughout the world between 1980 and 2000. Fair, supra note
72, at 37, 40.
74. Justin Huggler, Tamil Tigers apologize for suicide bomber’s murder of Rajiv
Gandhi, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2011), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/asia/tamil-tigers-apologise-suicide-bomber-s-murder-rajiv-gandhi405781.html.
75. However, the LTTE initially denied responsibility. Edward A. Gargan,
Suicide Bomber Kills President of Sri Lanka, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/02/world/suicide-bomber-kills-president-of-srilanka.html?
76. Fair, supra note 72, at 38.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 36.
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offences were included in the final version of the Rome Statute. 79 Some
of the reasons for the exclusion included the lack of agreed definition
of the crime, the risk of overburdening the Court with the crime despite
the lack of definition, and the fact that the crimes were seen as being
adequately addressed under existing international cooperation
agreements. 80
Following five weeks of deliberations, the ICC’s constitutive
instrument, the Rome Statute, was adopted by a vote of 120 states in
favor, 7 states against, and 21 abstentions. 81 Thus, the ICC was created
on July 17, 1998 and its jurisdiction became operational on July 1,
2002. 82 Sri Lanka abstained from voting. 83 Afterwards, the Sri Lankan
representative, John de Saram, provided an explanation for the
abstention, explaining:
[W]hile recognizing the great importance of establishing an
international criminal court, he was concerned that the Statute moved
into areas of international law that were still unclear. That concern
included extending the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court in relation to national jurisdictions, without national consent
and, on occasion, in a manner inconsistent with the law of treaties, in
particular, he regretted that the crime of terrorism had not been
included within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 84

Since then, Sri Lanka has taken part in several ICC Assembly of
States Parties (ASP) meetings as an observer State. 85 However, over the
79. Roy S. Lee, An Assessment of the ICC Statute, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 750,
756 (2001).
80. Id.
81. Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with
Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release
L/2889, (Jul. 20,1998).
82. Rome Statute, supra note 19.
83. Rome Conference Official Records, supra note 46, at 123.
84. Id.; Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with
Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal Court, U.N Press Release
L/2889 (Jul. 20, 1998). The representatives of India, Uruguay, Mauritius, Philippines,
Norway, Belgium, United States, Brazil, Israel, China, Turkey, Singapore and the
United Kingdom also provided explanations of the vote after the vote.
85. Fourth Session of the Assembly of States Parties Opens 28 November 2005,
INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 27, 2005), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?
name=fourth+session+of+the+assembly+of+states+parties+opens+28+november+
2005> accessed 14 April 2021; Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the
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years, it has shown limited interest in actively seeking member State
status with regard to the ICC or an interest in subjecting itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court.
B. Sri Lanka and the International Criminal Court at
Present
Some attempts have been made to outline the reasons for states,
such as Sri Lanka, deciding to refrain from ratifying or acceding to the
Rome Statute. 86 One of the main reasons for Sri Lanka’s non-accession
to the Rome Statute has been linked to the country’s fears that the ICC
could interfere in its internal affairs, thus affecting state sovereignty. 87
This might also be preventing Sri Lanka from lodging an Article 12(3)
declaration accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction. Similar fears have been
cited for the reluctance of many South Asian countries to join the
International Criminal Court. 88 Sri Lanka’s main reluctance to accede
to the Rome Statute has been linked to its doubts regarding how the
principle of complementarity would operate in terms of the Sri Lankan
justice system. 89
1. Reasons for Non-Accession
While the ICC operates to complement national judicial systems
and not to supersede them, only stepping in when a state is either unable
or unwilling to carry out national prosecutions, doubts have been raised
regarding how the principle of complementarity would operate with
regard to Article 4 of the Sri Lankan Constitution, which outlines
provisions regarding the exercise of sovereignty. 90 The UNSC’s powers
International Criminal Court, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://asp.icc-cpi.int
/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP16/ASP16-List-StateParties_ObserverStates_InvitedStatesENG.pdf accessed 14 April 2020.
86. Niriella, supra note 17.
87. Id. at 193-194.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 211.
90. Article 4 of the Constitution stipulates that the “Sovereignty of the People
shall be exercised and enjoyed in the following manner: Article 4 (a) “the legislative
power of the People shall be exercised by Parliament, consisting of elected
representatives of the People and by the People at a Referendum;” and Article 4 (c)
“the judicial power of the People shall be exercised by Parliament through courts,
tribunals and institutions created and established, or recognized, by the Constitution
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to refer a situation from a non-ICC member state to the Court, and the
power entrusted to the ICC Prosecutor to initiate a proprio motu
investigation into a situation, have especially been flagged by Sri
Lankan academics as instances that may violate state sovereignty. 91 In
these two scenarios, the fear appears to lie in the fact that Sri Lankan’s
state sovereignty may be violated due to “political influence … at [the]
national or international level” 92 with the Court exercising the
jurisdictional reach it has over non-state parties to the Rome Statute, “in
an arbitrary manner.” 93 As outlined later in this article, this last concern
has also been reiterated by some senior members of the Sri Lankan
government.
While the civil war was still ongoing, ratification of or accession to
the Rome Statute was seen as being problematic. Sri Lanka considered
the armed conflict to be a purely “internal dispute…of the Sri Lanka[n]
government security forces with the LTTE” that did not warrant
international scrutiny. 94 Sri Lanka’s reluctance to accept international
legal obligations that apply to non-international armed conflicts—the
category under which its civil war fell—is evident. For instance, the
country signed Geneva Conventions I to IV, which apply to
international armed conflicts 95 on February 28, 1959, and later enacted
the Geneva Conventions Act, No. 4 of 2006 domestically. 96 At the date
of writing, the Geneva Conventions Act 2006 has not yet been
operationalized in Sri Lanka. 97 Moreover, Sri Lanka has neither signed
or created and established by law, except in regard to matters relating to the privileges,
immunities and powers of Parliament and of its Members, wherein the judicial power
of the People may be exercised directly by Parliament according to law.” THE
CONSTITUTION OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA Oct. 29, 2020;
Niriella, supra note 17, at 211-12.
91. Niriella, supra note 17, at 212.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 214.
94. Id. at 212.
95. This is with the exception of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
that applies to non-international armed conflicts.
96. See Treaties, State Parties and Commentaries, Sri Lanka, INT’L COMM. OF
RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesBy
THE
CountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=LK; Geneva Conventions Act, 2006 (No.
4/2006) (Sri Lanka), https://www.moj.gov.lk/web/images/latest_document//
2006/1480651525-a04-geneva-convention-2006-en.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2021)
[hereinafter Geneva Conventions Act 2006 SL].
97. Wanigasuriya, supra note 25 at 236.
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nor ratified Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which
applies to non-international armed conflicts. 98
Furthermore, the domestic Geneva Conventions Act 2006 does not
include any provisions that criminalize violations of Common Article 3
to the Geneva Conventions that apply to non-international armed
conflicts. 99 According to the drafters of the initial Sri Lankan Geneva
Conventions Bill (drafted in 2001), the bill contained provisions
relating to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 100 These
provisions were included in the bill following the guidance of legal
advisers from the International Committee of the Red Cross
headquarters in Geneva. 101 No express reasons for excluding the
provisions related to Common Article 3 from the final Act were ever
given. However, the above indicates Sri Lanka’s reluctance to accept
and be bound by international legal obligations that apply to noninternational armed conflicts such as the country’s civil war.
Yet another argument against subjecting itself to the jurisdiction of
the ICC has been the view held by many national experts that Sri Lanka
possesses “strong substantial and procedural laws to impose . . .
criminal liability on individuals who [have] committed crimes” albeit
as ordinary Penal Code offences (i.e. murder, assault, criminal force,
etc.) prosecuted through the domestic judicial system as opposed to
being prosecuted as core international crimes. 102 However, Sri Lanka’s
national laws do not currently include provisions on modes of liability
that recognize superior responsibility, command responsibility, etc.103
98. See Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating To the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED
CROSS,
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_
viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=475, (last visited Mar.
23, 2021); Wanigasuriya, supra note 25 at 236.
99. It is important to note however, that despite this, Sri Lanka continues to be
bound by its obligations under customary international law, including with regard to
customary international law provisions that apply to non-international armed
conflicts. Wanigasuriya, supra note 25 at 236; Geneva Conventions Act 2006 SL,
supra note 96.
100. Dayantha Laksiri Mendis, Implementing Geneva Resolutions, SUNDAY
ISLAND
(Feb. 12, 2021), https://island.lk/implementing-geneva-resolutions/.
101. Id.
102. Niriella, supra note 17, at 212.
103. Wanigasuriya, supra note 25 at 260.
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In the absence of such national provisions, domestic prosecutions under
the current Sri Lankan criminal law provisions may fail to capture the
full range of potential perpetrators and full scope of superior and
command responsibility that would lead to the prosecution of those
most responsible for committing any alleged crimes linked to the civil
war.
2. Political Climate and Pragmatic Considerations
The political climate and other pragmatic considerations prevalent
in Sri Lanka are also important considerations when analyzing what
may prevent the accession to the Rome Statute and more specifically,
prevent the lodging of an Article 12(3) declaration accepting the ICC’s
jurisdiction. In Sri Lanka, senior government officials and those
holding notable state, diplomatic, and military posts have been accused
of allegedly committing international crimes during the civil war era.104
Sri Lanka’s current Prime Minister, Mahinda Rajapaksa, was the
country’s President and the Commander-in-Chief of Sri Lanka’s armed
forces between 2005 and 2015, when some of the alleged international
crimes linked to the civil war were committed. 105 The current Sri
Lankan President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, was the defense secretary in
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government, who had direct responsibility for the
conduct of government forces from 2005 to 2015. 106 Since his election,
the current Sri Lankan president has continued to afford
“unprecedented policymaking powers to serving and retired military

104. In a January 2010 cable by the US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Patricia
Butenis stated, “There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale
investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or
government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact
that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior
civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and
opposition candidate General Fonseka.” US Embassy Cables: Rajapaksa Shares
Responsibility for 2009 Sri Lankan Massacre, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2010, 2:10
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/243811
[hereinafter US Embassy Cables].
105. Sri Lanka: Justice Under Attack, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Feb. 1, 2021),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/01/sri-lanka-justice-under-attack.
106. Id.
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officers, many of whom UN or other non-governmental investigations
have implicated in human rights and humanitarian law violations.” 107
Sri Lanka has also appointed several decorated ‘war heroes’ to key
diplomatic positions despite having played major roles in the civil war
against the LTTE. 108 Other controversial military figures have been
promoted. For instance, Army General Shavendra Silva, who is alleged
to have been involved in the extrajudicial killings and torture of LTTE
members that took place during the final stages of the war while he led
the 58th Division of the Sri Lankan Army, was promoted to the rank of
Lieutenant General and appointed to the post of the commander of the
Sri Lankan Army in August 2019. 109 Moreover, following the outbreak
of the COVID-19 pandemic, Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva was
appointed as Sri Lanka’s Head of the National Operation Centre for
Prevention of COVID 19 Outbreak (“NOCPCO”). 110 During the
107. Alan Keenan, Sri Lanka: Prevention Should Be at Heart of Human Rights
CRISIS
GRP.
(Feb.
25,
2021),
Council
Resolution,
INT’L
https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-prevention-shouldbe-heart-new-human-rights-council-resolution; Yasmin Sooka, Joint Press Release:
From the Battlefield to the Boardroom—The Militarisation of Sri Lanka, INT’L TRUTH
AND JUST. PROJECT AND JOURNALISTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN SRI LANKA (Jan. 19,
2019),
http://www.jdslanka.org/images/documents/jds_itjp_battlefield_to_boardroom_19_0
1_2021_en.pdf.
108. E.g. Former Director of Operations Sri Lankan Army: Major General
Udaya Perera (appointed as Deputy High Commissioner to Malaysia), Former Air
Force Commander and Chief of Defence Staff: Air Chief Marshal Donald Perera
(ambassador to Israel), former Navy Commander Admiral: Wasantha Karannagoda
(ambassador to Japan), etc.; Mandana Ismail Abeywickrema, The Militarisation of Sri
Lanka’s Diplomatic and Administrative Services, THE SUNDAY LEADER (Jan. 23,
2011),
http://www.thesundayleader.lk/2011/01/23/the-militarisation-of-srilanka%E2%80%99s-diplomatic-and-administrative-services/.
109. US Court Dismisses War Crimes Case Against Shavendra Silva, BBC,
https://www.bbc.com/sinhala/news/story/2012/02/120209_shavendra (last visited
Mar. 25, 2021); Reuters Staff; U.N. Suspends Sri Lankan Troops From Peacekeeping
Over Army Chief Appointment, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-un-peacekeepers/un-suspends-sri-lankan-troopsfrom-peacekeeping-over-army-chief-appointment-idUSKBN1WA2SL; Sri Lankan
General Accused of War Abuses Appointed Army Chief, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/8/19/sri-lankan-general-accused-of-warabuses-appointed-army-chief.
110. The NOCPCO was established by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to
“coordinate preventive and management measures to ensure that healthcare and other
services are well geared to serve the general public.” President’s Media Division,
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ongoing pandemic, General Silva was considered to have “become the
public face of the [heavily militarized government pandemic] response,
as key decisions and announcements linked to the health crisis
continued to be communicated by him.” 111
When the ICC exercises jurisdiction regarding a situation and
initiates prosecutions, the Court usually prosecutes high-level
perpetrators, leaving the prosecuting of low-level perpetrators to the
national level. If the Sri Lankan situation were to be referred to the ICC
by the UNSC or if Sir Lanka accepted jurisdiction pursuant to an Article
12(3), this would pose a risk to high-ranking government and military
officials. 112 If a potential ICC investigation into the situation in Sri
Lanka led to prosecutions, given that the majority of the LTTE
leadership was said to have been wiped out during the final stages of
the civil war, 113 uncertainty would exist about how many senior LTTE

Army Commander Shavendra Silva Heads National Operation Center for Prevention
of COVID- 19 Outbreak, PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARIAT (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.
presidentsoffice.gov.lk/index.php/2020/03/17/army-commander-shavendra-silvaheads-national-operation-center-for-prevention-of-covid-19-outbreak/;
Head,
NOCPCO Appeals the Public to Adopt Strict Health Practices, SRI LANKA ARMY,
NATIONAL OPERATION CENTRE FOR PREVENTION OF COVID-19 OUTBREAK (Oct. 22,
2020, 9:04AM) https://alt.army.lk/covid19/content/head-nocpco-appeals-publicadopt-strict-health-practices-0.
111. Bhavani Fonseka & Kushmila Ranasinghe, Sri Lanka’s Accelerated
Democratic Decay Amidst a Pandemic, in PRADEEP PEIRIS ED., IS THE CURE WORSE
THAN THE DISEASE? REFLECTIONS ON COVID GOVERNANCE IN SRI LANKA 42, 42
(2021).
112. Wanigasuriya, supra note 25, at 247-48.
113. The LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed during the last phases
of the war along with other senior LTTE members, including intelligence head, Pottu
Amman and Sea Tiger leader, Soosai. UN reports have found further reasonable
grounds to believe that additional senior members of the LTTE (e.g. Head of LTTE
Peace Secretariat, Seevaratnam Puleedevan; Head of the LTTE Political Wing,
Balasingham Nadesan; and LTTE Commander Thambirasa Thurairajasingham alias
Col. Ramesh), who either surrendered to or were captured by the Sri Lankan armed
forces during the final stage of the civil war, were executed by the security forces.
Selvarasa Pathmanathan, Mark of Respect for Our Supreme Leader: The
Indestructible Flame of Freedom, ILANKAI TAMIL SANGAM (ASSOCIATION OF TAMILS
OF SRI LANKA IN THE USA), (May 24, 2009), https://sangam.org/
2010/06/LTTE_Announcement_English.pdf.; Amantha Perera, Colombo: Tamil
Tiger Leader Killed in Ambush, TIME (May 18, 2009), http://content.time.com/
time/world/article/0,8599,1899160,00.html; Report of the United Nations Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights Investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL), Hum.
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leaders would be alive to face prosecution for alleged international
crimes they may have committed during the conflict. Remaining
notable LTTE members are limited to a handful including, Selvarajah
Pathmanathan, 114 Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan,115 and Sivanesathurai
Chandrakanthan. 116 Therefore, if any prosecutions stemming from the
situation were initiated at the ICC, this could lead to the possibility that
the majority of those appearing in front of the Court could be highranking Sri Lankan government and military officials from the civil war
era. 117 Given the allegations levelled against some of them, it is highly
unlikely the current Sri Lankan executive would want to voluntarily
initiate the process of lodging an Article 12(3) declaration accepting the
ICC’s jurisdiction, that carries the potential risk of these high ranking
officials being prosecuted at the International Criminal Court.
Furthermore, statements by senior politicians (in successive Sri
Lankan governments) display an absence of political will to accept the
jurisdiction of any international criminal justice institution that would
probe the allegations of international crimes committed during the civil
war. For instance, in a January 2010 cable by the US Ambassador to Sri
Lanka Patricia Butenis, the US Ambassador explained that the then
President of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapakse (who is the current Sri
Rts. Council on its Thirteenth Session, at 62-70, ¶¶ 285-322, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/30/CRP.2 (Sept. 16, 2015).
114. A.k.a. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, a.k.a. Kumaran Pathmanathan, a.k.a. KP,
the LTTE’s diplomatic chief (Head of International Relations) who was in charge of
the LTTE’s smuggling and weapon acquisitions, is believed to be the most senior
LTTE operative still alive. Manjula Fernando, Arrest of Nanthagopan: Turning Point
in Battle Against LTTE Remnants, SUNDAY OBSERVER (Apr. 13, 2014),
http://archives.sundayobserver.lk/2014/04/13/fea00.asp.
115. A.k.a. Colonel Karuna Amman is said to have defected from the LTTE in
2004, and led a paramilitary group, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, which
allegedly committed war crimes including the recruitment of child soldiers. Bhavani
Fonseka, The Long Wait For Justice, HIMAL SOUTH ASIAN (Aug. 7, 2020),
https://www.himalmag.com/the-long-wait-for-justice-srilanka-2020/; Sri Lanka:
Probe into LTTE Crimes Should Start with Karuna, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 28.
2013),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/28/sri-lanka-probe-ltte-crimes-shouldstart-karuna.
116. A.k.a. Pillayan was a former LTTE cadre and ex-deputy to Colonel Karuna
Amman. Sri Lanka: Collapse of Joseph Pararajasingham Murder Case: A Failure of
Justice, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/news/2021/01/sri-lanka-collapse-of-joseph-pararajasingham-murder-casea-failure-of-justice/.
117. Wanigasuriya, supra note 25, at 248.
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Lankan Prime Minister) had “personally [promised] to stand up to any
international power or body that would try to prosecute Sri Lankan war
heroes.” 118 Indeed, President Rajapakse expressed his opposition to any
international legal process that allowed for the prosecution of Sri
Lankan nationals by an international tribunal or through the judicial
system of a second state. 119 In 2017, he opined that no accused facing
such a trial could expect justice to be served and that such prosecutions
were always politically motivated. 120
Successive Sri Lankan governments and senior Sri Lankan
government officials have adopted an approach where they push all
allegations of international crimes aside, moving forward as if no
international crimes have been committed. This approach has been
preferred over subjecting itself 121 to the jurisdiction of the ICC, or
another investigative and prosecutorial mechanism that would address
the alleged violations of international law during the civil war. For
instance, addressing journalists in 2019, the former Sri Lankan
president, Maithripala Sirisena, stated that Sri Lanka can solve its own
issues and instead of revisiting past occurrences and renewing old
wounds, everyone should forget past instances and dedicate themselves
118. US Embassy Cables, supra note 104.
119. “An accused facing trial for an alleged crime committed in one State, at a
court of a different foreign State, or facing trial at an international criminal tribunal
which is sustained by funds contributed by a group of foreign countries, can never
expect justice to be served. Such a trial is always initiated in order to achieve some
political motive.” (“එ� රටක ���වා යැ� �යන අපරාධය� සඳහා ෙවන�
රටක අ�කරණයක, නැ�න� ෙවන� රටව� ස�හය� ��� �ද� වැය
කර�� පව�වාෙගන යන ජාත්ය�තර අපරාධ අ�කරණයක න�වකට
��ණ ෙදන ��තෙය�ට ��දාක ���ය� බලාෙපාෙරා�� �ය
ෙනාහැ�ය. ඒ ආකාරයට න� පැව�ම� �� ව�ෙ�, හැම�ටම ෙ�ශපාලන
අ�මතා�ථය� ඉ�කරගැ�ම සදහාය.” (author’s own translation from
Sinhala))). ම��ද රාජප� මාධ්ය �ෙ�දනය: �ද අපරාධ ජාත්ය�තර
අ�කරණ නම ෙවන� කර එ�. [Press Statement by Mahinda Rajapaksa: The
International War Crimes Tribunals Returns Under a Different Name], LANKA C
NEWS (July 2, 2017), https://lankacnews.com/%E0%B6%BA%E0%B7%94%
E0%B6%AF-%E0%B6%85%E0%B6%B4%E0%B6%BB%E0%B7%8F%E0%B6
%B0-%E0%B6%A2%E0%B7%8F%E0%B6%AD%E0%B7%8A%E2%80%8D%
E0%B6%BA%E0%B6%B1%E0%B7%8A%E0%B6%AD%E0%B6%BB-%E0%B6
%85%E0%B6%B0%E0%B7%92/.
120. Id.
121. Albeit pursuant to individual criminal responsibility and not State
responsibility.
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to peace. 122 Later the same year, prior to his election as the country’s
new president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa opined that instead of dwelling on
the past, one should focus on the future stating, “We have to move
forward, we have to forget about hanging on to old allegations and all
that.” 123
Moreover, successive Sri Lankan governments have repeatedly
denied any wrongdoing by the government forces during the civil war.
Addressing the parliament in May 2009, former president, Mahinda
Rajapaksa stated that Sri Lankan “troops went to [the battlefield]
carrying a gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in the other,”
a statement which he later reiterated at the second National Victory
Day anniversary celebrations. 124 Additionally, in a May 2009 interview
during his previous tenure as the country’s Defense Secretary,
Gotabaya Rajapaksa responded to questions regarding the alleged
commission of war crimes by Sri Lankan troops. 125 Here, he stated that
the Sri Lankan military had taken all necessary precautions to prevent
civilian casualties. 126 He added that the United Kingdom and the United
122. “We will solve our own problems. It has been 10 years since the war ended.
Instead of digging into these issues and renewing old wounds, which would lead to
hurt feelings, I hope to urge everyone to forget all of this and dedicate themselves to
achieving peace” (“ෙ� ප්ර�න අ� �සඳග�න�. ��ධය ඉවර ෙවලා දැ�
අ��� 10� ගත ෙවලා නැවත ෙ� පරණ ෙ�ව� හාර හාර �වාල පාරෙගන
�� අමනාප කර�ෙ� නැ�ව අ� �ය� ෙදනා ම සාමය සඳහා කැපෙව�න
�යලා ඉ�ල�න බලාෙපාෙරා�� ෙවනවා ෙ�වා අමතක කරලා” (author’s
own translation from Sinhala)). �ද අපරාධ ෙචෝදනා: “ෙයෝජනා ඉ� ��ම
රණ��ව�ට ෙද්රෝ� �ම� ෙනාෙ�” [War Crimes Allegations: “Making
Recommendations is Not a Betrayal of War Heroes”], BBC (Mar. 20, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/sinhala/sri-lanka-47624136.
123. Krishan Francis, Sri Lanka Presidential Hopeful Says won’t Honor Deal
with UN, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (Oct. 15, 2019), https://apnews.com/
article/b27e1bbb45cc42488b5e6d67415110de.
124. Mahinda Rajapaksa stated: “I said in the past that our troops went to the
battlefront carrying a gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in the other . . .. . .
They did not target any communities or religions, and did not march ahead with hatred
towards anyone.” Sri Lanka: ‘Our aim was to liberate our Tamil people from
the clutches of the LTTE’–President, R ELIEF W EB (May 20, 2009),
https://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-our-aim-was-liberate-our-tamilpeople-clutches-ltte-president.
125. Lanka lashes out at West’s criticism, NDTV (May 22, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vtm54Y9USEg accessed 15 December 2020.
126. Id.
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States should investigate their own troops before attempting to
investigate and try Sri Lankans at war crime tribunals. 127
Furthermore, in Sri Lanka today, many remain unaware of how the
jurisdiction of the ICC and how its sentencing provisions 128 operate in
practice. It has been reported that supporters of former President
Mahinda Rajapaksa were under the impression that attempts were being
made by some “to send him to the electric chair” 129 for execution
through the ICC process or through another international
mechanism. 130 Speaking in parliament in 2020, the country’s former
Foreign Minister, Mangala Samaraweera, stated measures such as cosponsoring the UNHRC resolution 30/1were meant to act as an exercise
to shield alleged perpetrators of any international crimes from being
investigated and prosecuted, and to divert international attention from
the issue. 131 He also explained, “[T]hrough resolution 30/1 [we]
127. Id.
128. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 19, arts 76-77.
129. The Rome Statute does not allow the imposition of the death penalty. Rome
Statute, supra note 19, art. 77 .
130. “The former president and many of his associates stated that some
individuals who were jealous of the service he rendered to the country, were
attempting to send him to the electric chair. However, Ranil Wickramasighe correctly
explained the legal basis that prevents the ICC from prosecuting a senior member of
the Sri Lankan government. He explained that as prime minister, he refused to ratify
the Rome Statute…” (“රටට කළ ෙ�වයට ඉ��යා කරන ඇතැ�� �ට�
ජනප� ��� ��වට යැ�මට අර අ�න බව ඔ� ෙම�ම ඔ� වටා ��
ෙබාෙහෝ ��ස� සඳහ� කළහ. න�� අගමැ� ර�� �ක්රම�ංහ මහතා
එය වඩා� �වැ��ව ජාත්ය�තර අපරාධ අ�කරණය හ�වට � ලංකාෙ�
නායකය� කැඳ�ය ෙනාහැ� �මට සරල ��මය ප��ම පැහැ�� කර�
ලැ�ය. අගමැ�වරයා පළ�වරට තම �රෙ� කට�� කරන �ට ෙරෝම�
ප්රඥ��යට අ�ස� තැ�ම ප්ර��ෙ�ප කළ බව සඳහ� කර��…”
(author’s own translation from Sinhala)). ෙමාක�ද ෙ� �ල�ට� (ෙපා��)
ෙබෝ�බ ෙචෝදනාව? [What is the Cluster Bomb Allegation?], DINAMINA (June 25,
2016), http://www.dinamina.lk/2016/06/25/18272?page=2.
131. “During those days the former president Mahinda Rajapaksa went around
stating, “They are trying to take me to the electric chair. However, through resolution
30/1 we managed to prevent them from taking him to the electric chair.” (“ඒ
කාලෙ� �ට� ජනා�ප� ම��ද රාජප�ෂ මැ��මා ම �ය �යා �යා
“මා ��� ��වට ෙග�ය�න හදනවා” �යලා. න�� ෙ� 30/1 ෙයෝජනාව
හරහා තම�, අ� ම��� රාජප�ෂ ��� ��වට ෙගන යන එක�
වළ�වාග�ෙ�” (author’s own translation from Sinhala)). MP Mangala
Samaraweera, PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES HANSARD 716 (Feb. 20, 2020),
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stopped Mahinda Rajapaksa from being taken to the electric chair [for
execution].” 132
While the former Prime Minister, Ranil Wickramasighe, is said to
have attempted to explain the operation of the ICC’s jurisdictional reach
and its limitations due to Sri Lanka not being a State Party to the Rome
Statute, 133 such confusion still persists. For instance, in early 2019,
Tamil National Alliance (“TNA”) parliamentarian M.A. Sumanthiran
said that despite preferring a hybrid mechanism for pursuing justice,
unless Sri Lanka agreed to include international judges in such an
accountability mechanism with the view of ensuring impartiality, his
party would “take steps to move Sri Lanka to the International Criminal
Court.” 134 Such statements made in parliament indicate a lack of
understanding among Sri Lankan parliamentarians as to how the ICC’s
jurisdiction operates (especially given the jurisdictional obstacles since
Sri Lanka is a non-State Party to the Rome Statute and the unlikelihood
of the situation being referred to the ICC by the UNSC).
Instead of cooperating with bodies that have the potential to probe
any alleged international crimes committed during the civil war in Sri
Lanka, the current Sri Lankan government has taken steps to distance
itself from such bodies and organizations. 135 In May 2020, at the War
Heroes Day marking the 11th anniversary of the Sri Lankan military’s
victory over the LTTE, Gotabaya Rajapaksa commented, they “will
not hesitate to withdraw from any organization or agency if our war
heroes are targeted.” 136 Hence, given that accepting the jurisdiction
https://www.parliament.lk/uploads/documents/hansard/1582783760041878.pdf.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 2019.03.22- Sri Lanka parliament live, NEWS-I (Mar. 22, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iExheft7KXw&t=4994s.
135. E.g. On 26 February 2020, the Sri Lankan government announced its
withdrawal of support for Human Rights Council Resolution 40/1 (which incorporates
Resolutions 30/1 and 34/1) thus withdrawing from its commitment to establish a
domestic accountability mechanism that would probe the alleged international crimes
committed during the civil war. High level Segment Statement by Hon. Dinesh
Gunawardena, Minister of Foreign Relations of Sri Lanka, FOREIGN MINISTRY—SRI
LANKA (Feb. 26, 2020), https://mfa.gov.lk/43rd-session-hrc/.
136. Sri Lanka Will Withdraw From Any International Forum if ‘War
Heroes’ Targeted: Gotabaya Rajapaksa, NEW INDIA EXPRESS, (May 19, 2020, 9:48
PM),
https://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2020/may/19/sri-lanka-will-with
draw-from-any-international-forum-if-war-heroes-targeted-gotabaya-rajapaksa2145420.html.
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of the ICC holds the possibility that an investigation by the Court may
lead to the prosecution of senior government figures and military
personnel, it is unlikely that the present Sri Lankan government will
take any steps towards accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Despite taking part in the Rome Conference and the early drafting
stages for a statute to establish a permanent international criminal court,
Sri Lanka’s relationship with the ICC, especially during the years
following the end of the country’s decades-long civil war, can be
described as strained. Sri Lanka appears to be concerned that accepting
the ICC’s jurisdiction would contravene its state sovereignty. Attempts
at international intervention in probing the alleged international crimes
committed during the civil war have repeatedly been rejected.
However, the greatest obstacle for accepting the Court’s jurisdiction,
especially through lodging an Article 12(3) declaration covering the
period during which alleged international crimes are said to have been
committed, may be posed by the present political climate within the
country.
The possibility certainly exists that Sri Lanka is concerned about
the political implications of accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction. 137 Across
South Asia, some states have accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, but the
number of countries is limited to less than a handful and regional
heavyweights such as India have remained non-members. 138 This
greatly diminishes pressure on Sri Lanka to accept the Court’s
jurisdiction. Moreover, limited pressure is exerted by Sri Lankan civil
society actors for acceding to the Rome Statute due to their lack of
knowledge, experience, and resources. 139 Lack of understanding
regarding the ICC’s jurisdictional reach may further prevent Sri Lanka
from taking the step towards acceding to the Rome Statute. In any case,
a clear lack of political will exists in Sri Lanka to accept the ICC’s
137. Seeking Justice in Sri Lanka: National and International Remedies for
Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law,
INT’L FED’N FOR HUM. RTS. 6 (2006), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46f146c60.pdf
[hereinafter Seeking Justice in Sri Lanka].
138. Only three South Asian States (i.e. Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Maldives)
are ICC States Parties. See South Asia, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 30, 2021),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/sar/overview.
139. Seeking Justice in Sri Lanka, supra note 137, at 27.
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jurisdiction, be it through acceding to the Rome Statute or by lodging
an Article 12(3) declaration with the Court. Consequently, justice for
the international crimes allegedly committed during the civil war of the
past remains, at best, elusive.
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